52. Therefore it is one thing to know the laws of inference, and
another to know the truth of opinions. In the former case we learn
what is consequent, what is inconsequent, and what is incompatible.
An example of a consequent is, "If he is an orator, he is a man;"
of an inconsequent, "If he is a man, he is an orator;" of an
incompatible, "If he is a man, he is a quadruped." In these
instances we judge of the connection. In regard to the truth of
opinions, however, we must consider propositions as they stand by
themselves, and not in their connection with one another; but when
propositions that we are not sure about are joined by a valid inference
to propositions that are true and certain, they themselves, too,
necessarily become certain. Now some, when they have ascertained the
validity of the inference, plume themselves as if this involved also
the truth of the propositions. Many, again, who hold the true
opinions have an unfounded contempt for themselves, because they are
ignorant of the laws of inference; whereas the man who knows that there
is a resurrection of the dead is assuredly better than the man who only
knows that it follows that if there is no resurrection of the dead,
then is Christ not risen.